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Abstract
The relationship between media and politics in Iran is significantly complicated and multidimensional. Although the
so-called independent press and news media are being published in a regular basis, the entire media sphere is
being shaped by the state regime, and most of media platforms reflect the state’s will. The main goals of this article
are to explain the present conditions and characteristics of the relationship between media and politics and to
explore the social and cultural causes, discourses, and myths which have allegedly justified the strong
governmental interventions and influences in the Iranian media sphere. We consider causal layered analysis (CLA),
as a critical futures studies method, to be an appropriate method to deconstruct the present status and envision
the future of the relationship between media and politics in Iran. We utilize four different layers of analysis. First, we
determine different aspects of litany level, including the role of media in promoting enmity in discourse about
Iran’s enemies, real and fictitious. Second, we specify different systemic causes for the current relationship between
media and politics, including the continuous attempts of Iran’s state regime to control and dominate the entire
media sphere. Third, we review the two main discourses involved in the 1978–1979 Revolution in Iran. Each
discourse is focused on constructing alternative responses to the controversy between tradition and modernity in
the contemporary history of Iran. Fourth, in the entitled level of metaphor or myth, we identify the narrative of
“Educating the Populace” as the deepest myth behind the relationship between media and politics in Iran. At the
next stage of this study, we construct the possible scenarios for the future of the relationship between media and
politics in Iran based on the dominance of competitive root discourses. Finally, we argue that one should go
beyond the discursive layer to find the alternative futures of the relationship between media and politics in Iran.
These alternative futures are associated with the emancipation from the competition between the traditionalism
and modernism discourses and changing the deepest myths behind the relationship between media and politics.
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Introduction
Media and politics are tightly interconnected in Iran;
thus, political deployment and a predilection for differ-
ent political opinions and objectives are crucial aspects
of Iran’s media sphere. As diverse, independent, and dis-
sident political parties and interest groups are apparently
not involved in the political system in Iran, almost all
media platforms represent the political interests and
objectives of the state regime, though these objectives
might be proposed by different power sects or various
political structures. They also play a focal role in the pol-
itical determination. Even though the left-right political
conflicts and negotiations have created a rich diverse
political sphere in Iran’s contemporary era, the common
trait here is the absence of ordinary people and public
participation in the political processes. Instead of estab-
lishing an institutional process for involvement in the
media sphere, politicians on both sides fully expect
media to inject their desired political objectives into the
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collective subconscious. Nevertheless, informal politics
influence decision-making behind closed doors, particu-
larly upon the advent of alternative media. While the
official and mainstream media platforms are being con-
trolled by the state regime, alternative interest groups
use alternative media and communication platforms to
raise their pluralistic demands, though these alternative
platforms are usually under several major limitations; for
example, they may be banned or filtered.
Politicians have always attempted to control and dom-
inate media power using top-down tactics to varying
extents. Whether during the Pahlavi era or after the
Iranian Revolution in 1978–1979, the history of media
and communication in Iran indicates that all the state
regimes and governments have aimed to control the
media sphere by different means, like through censor-
ship or licensing [1]. Media platforms are not officially
governmental organizations, and they are not included
in the state’s structure; thus, hierarchical orders in the
political structure cannot be applied to media platforms.
Consequently, officials and politicians resort to employ-
ing different media platforms to advocate their political
interests. These interests may be advanced through offi-
cial apparatus, like enforcing a law or legalizing censor-
ship, or unofficial ones like threatening and bribing
journalists or fulminating against those who do not sup-
port a certain political opinion or objective. Overall, the
most significant issue in the relationship between media
and politics in Iran is the fact that media have always
been controlled and dominated by the politics and polit-
ical structures. After the establishment of a modern cen-
tralized state regime in the country, all the political
systems and governments in Iran have tended not to co-
operate, negotiate, or participate but to control, bridle,
and supervise the media.
Despite all the attempts to control the media sphere,
the alternative media have been the essential tools to
raise public demands and give voice to the voiceless in
Iran’s history. Although the official and mainstream
media have always been under the control of the state
regime, alternative media have succeeded in affecting
official politics in different dimensions. They have influ-
enced several political outcomes and decision-making
processes, not only after the advent of social media but
also during the broadcasting era when the underground
press played an unprecedented role in the Persian
constitutional movement, which was mainly against the
divine right of the king to rule the country and set the
politics [2]. Alternative media resonate with new social
and political demands such as reform, freedom, equality,
social democracy, and citizenship, which are issues that
remain focal points of various contemporary social
struggles against traditionalism in Iran. In the recent
years, the Internet developments and the emergence of
new media platforms provide more feasible and diverse
tools and channels to echo alternative voices and de-
mand for public participation in the political procedures
and decision-making. In this context, it seems that the
technology has created a new opportunity for ordinary
people, as well as critical intellectuals, to play a more in-
fluential role in the political decision-making processes.
Although these alternative voices and informal politics
have been significantly reflected through alternative
media, a relatively free media sphere has not emerged in
Iran, as the majority of media platforms are still con-
trolled by the state regime, and the necessary alternative
political structures and institutions like political parties
are absent in the political system.
To sum up the current relationship between media
and politics in Iran in one glance, the mainstream media
are dominated by the state regime and aim at promoting
and propagating the state regime’s political interests and
objectives. At the same time, the alternative media try to
resist top-down politics to pursue the growing demands
of plural social strata in Iran.
To understand the pseudo-contradictory status of Iran’s
media sphere, we need to strip away the outward layers in
which the alternative media, backed by revisionist political
objectives, resist mainstream media which are striving to
institutionalize official governmental politics. The duality
between mainstream and alternative just demonstrates a
few narrow aspects of the entire reality of which all media
practice as well as political priorities have the same trait
and modality, particularly in a longer time frame. Causal
layered analysis (CLA) is one of the most credible theoret-
ical and methodological frameworks to understand the
deeper social causes and worldviews behind this reality.
Following a critical approach, our commitment to futures
studies is retrieved from the deconstruction of a limited
pretence that the old traditionalist system of political ob-
jectives (backed by the Islamic-regime controlled media)
could be tackled by the modernist media confrontation.
The more we are immersed in the historical data and
layers of analysis, the less we are satisfied with the claims
that highlight the alternative media sphere as a key driving
force for the political transformations. In other words, we
aim to show that the deepest narrative behind both the
traditionalism and modernism discourses in Iran is the
same narrative emphasizing educating the populace.
Our final objective in this text is to discover an alter-
native beyond the so-called discursive struggles between
tradition and modernity. In addition, to investigate the
external layers of analysis indicating how the contradic-
tion between opposite media agendas backed by differ-
ent political objectives are formulated, we elucidate the
deepest layers of metaphorical analysis indicating the
remarkable similarity and compromise on principles and
practices of the traditionalism and modernism
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discourses in Iran’s media politics. We argue that edu-
cating people, instead of informing them, is the most
preventive myth in the deepest layer of the relationship
between media and politics. After constructing the pos-
sible futures scenarios based on the discourse layer, we
also explain a vision of an alternative critical future
which can be imagined transforming the situation from
the status quo into a more desirable scenario. This part
is the most important contribution of this paper to the
literature of media politics. We claim that this alterna-
tive vision has a great credibility to open a spectrum of
alternative futures for the relationship between media
and politics.
Why CLA?
Causal layered analysis (CLA) is known as a critical fu-
tures research method which deepens the understandings
about the futures changes. According to Inayatullah, CLA
is based on the assumption that the way in which a prob-
lem is framed will have an impact on how a change in the
issue will be pursued [3]. While the theoretical under-
pinning of CLA is based on post-structuralism, the
approach is layered, that is, it is a method of analysis
which is inclusive of accounting for various streams
of causality operating in unison upon an issue [4].
As Inayatullah [3] explains, causal layered analysis
(CLA) consists of four dimensions. The first is the litany,
or the day-to-day layer, the commonly accepted head-
lines about the way things are or should be. Solutions to
problems are, at this level, usually short term. The
second dimension is deeper, focused on the social, eco-
nomic, and political causes of the issue. The third
dimension is the culture or worldview. This is the big
picture, the paradigm that informs what we think is real
or not real, the cognitive lens we use to understand and
shape the world. The fourth dimension is the myth or
the metaphor—this is the deep unconscious story behind
the issue.
CLA seeks to integrate these four levels of understand-
ing. Each level is true, and solutions need to be found at
each level. Litany interventions lead to short-term solu-
tions, easy to grasp, and packed with data, while social
and economic interventions are linked to deeper and
more systemic solutions which are usually constructed
through governmental policies. Worldview change is
much harder and longer-term. It requires seeking solu-
tions from outside the framework in which the solution
has been defined. And the myth solutions require the
deepest interventions, as this framework requires telling
a new story, rewiring the brain, and building new mem-
ories and the personal and collective body [5].
CLA has been vastly utilized in many different studies
in the previous literature. Different studies have used
CLA as the main research framework or as a
participatory environment for conducting workshops. It
has been applied in various case studies as a stand-alone
method or in combination with other futures methods
like scenarios, futures wheels, and backcasting. Some of
the most important practices of CLA are packed and
presented in the book, “The Causal Layered Analysis
(CLA) Reader.” According to Inayatullah [3], Bangkok
traffic futures (1993), the future of enrolments (1994),
housing persons with disabilities (1995), and the future
of United Nations (1996) are some of case studies apply-
ing CLA in research frameworks and the workshop
environment. In some recent studies, Lederwasch et al.
[6] apply CLA to create the future visions of mining and
mineral industry in Australia; Shevellar [7] reflects upon
the usefulness of CLA as a means of responding to
dilemmas within the current practice of community de-
velopment; and Bishop and Dzidik [8] utilize CLA as a
qualitative methodology well-suited for psychology and
define a space for its adoption in the discipline.
CLA aims to dig deeply into how the thinking of those
participating in futures works directs them in foreseeing
the future [9]. The benefits of CLA include bringing
scope and richness to scenario thinking, helping with
taking into consideration the different knowledge-related
practices and abilities of the actors, connecting the less
“hard” sciences to the future processes, and moving the
discussion naturally from a self-evident level to deeper
levels. In this sense, we find CLA an appropriate method
to analyze the relationship between media and politics in
the present and the future in a deepened manner and to
explore the role of key actors and influential parties in
this relationship.
Moreover, CLA assists us to view the relationship be-
tween media and politics in Iran in a historical and
deepened manner and to analyze this relationship in
different layers. Accordingly, this study identifies and
analyzes social causes and crucial actors of media and
politics in Iran and explores which cultural worldviews
and unconscious narratives have justified the present
situation. Moreover, by applying CLA and recognizing
the central worldview behind the relationship between
media and politics, the possible scenarios for the future
of media and politics in Iran are constructed in a discur-
sive and critical manner.
According to the CLA approach, every phenomenon is
constructed in at least four diverse levels, which
contain their specific time horizons, analytical realms,
causal conjunctions, and practical solutions. Thus,
critical futures studies, and CLA as a critical futures
research method, are not only about anticipating and
constructing the futures scenarios. As Inayatullah [10]
explains, in critical approach, the task is not one of
predictions or comparisons (as in the interpretive) but
of making units of analysis problematic. In other
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words, the critical approach aims to deconstruct the
present power relations, understand the historical
causes and discourses which resulted in the present
situation, and evoke alternative possibilities for the
future.
This study reflects upon the crucial usefulness of CLA
in studying the relationship between media and politics
in general by focusing on the analysis of this relationship
in the case of Iran. Exploring this relationship in Iran as
a case study is not only crucial for anticipating the
future challenges in Iran in a bigger picture but also a
good theoretical and methodological approach to analyze
the relationship between media and politics in other coun-
tries and other contexts. Any political entity, whether it is
a nation-state or a larger one like the European Union,
must establish a particular articulation between media
obligations and political objectives, and CLA can be an
appropriate method for such an articulation.
In this sense, the application of CLA for critical
analysis of the relationship between media and politics
in Iran is significantly useful and important from a
European perspective due to the fact that it not only
provides an appropriate case study, the method of
which academicians can pursue, but also might facilitate
the deconstruction of the relationship between media and
politics in other contexts like the European countries.
With a deconstructive perspective, knowledge is achiev-
able and conceivable by the contradictory negations,
instead of the affirmative harmony of descriptions. Thus,
our findings might indirectly provide an outlook for the
media politics in Europe by demonstration of how distinct
relationships between media and politics are established
in Iran, currently or throughout history.
In this paper, we unfold the most vital story, which has
been told by Iranian intellectuals and politicians
throughout the modern history of Iran to legitimate a
particular set of power relations between media and
politics. This story introduces media as the means for
educating people, and it differs significantly from the
conventional Western narrative that articulates media as
the vital instrument to promote and protect the freedom
of speech on the one hand and recognizes politics as the
crystallization of public demands expressed through
mediated channels on the other hand. We explain and
explore the implications of this deep story for the rela-
tionship between media and politics in Iran in different
layers, while we advocate the Western model of media
politics as an alternative and more desirable alternative
for Iran. However, the plausibility of such an alternative
and the role of Western influential parties, like acad-
emies and media platforms in shaping an alternative re-
lationship between media and politics in Iran, remain
the unexplored questions. Thus, this manuscript might
assist the European political powers and media initiatives
in understanding the current relationship between media
and politics in Iran, including its deepest discourses and
narratives, and facilitate the emergence of alternative
possibilities in the future, of course without a direct
linkage between Iranian issues and European notations.
Litany layer: contemporary media and politics in
Iran
The litany level is the most visible and obvious, requir-
ing few analytic capabilities. It is believed, rarely ques-
tioned. As Inayatullah says, the litany level is about the
superficial and present problems, issues, events, and
trends [3]. They are usually presented in news media,
routine documents and reports, and current rules and
legislation. Regarding the relationship between media
and politics in Iran, at the litany level, all the relevant
news, documents, and laws on the interconnections
between politics and media sphere are of concern. In
this sense, we scan many different documents, particu-
larly all the relevant reinforced laws and legislation on
media and media regulations in Iran. By scanning, col-
lecting, and conducting exploratory content analysis, we
identify the crucial key elements with which the present
relationship between media and politics in Iran is shaped
and defined (Table 1).
Table 1 Key elements of the relationship between media and politics in the litany layer
Key elements Mainstream Alternative
Media ownership State monopoly in broadcasting
State-owned press
State-owned media infrastructure
State-owned national data network
Private and commercial ownership in press media
Foreign ownership in digital and social media
Media control Licensing and license detention
Filtering
Parasites
Restrictions on broadband infrastructures
VPNs, anti-filters, and other internet proxies
Satellite television channels
Underground publications
Media content production Traditionalist
Islamist
Anti-Western
Secular
Modernist
Pro-Western
Semi-nationalist
Talebian and Talebian European Journal of Futures Research  (2018) 6:8 Page 4 of 15
Media ownership is the first key element of the rela-
tionship between media and politics in Iran. Following a
conventional categorization of media, all media plat-
forms can be assigned one of three categories including
press media, broadcast media, and digital media. The
majority of the mainstream media in all three categories
are owned by the state regime in Iran. State-owned media
can be defined as media which are financially and editori-
ally controlled and administered by different governing
bodies and departments.1 Regarding this definition, radio
and television broadcasting in Iran is completely owned
and monopolized by the state regime, while digital media
and press media are partly state-owned, while some kinds
of privately owned and alternative media are coexisting
with the state-owned ones as well.
Article 175 of Iran’s constitution [11], which guaran-
tees the freedom of expression in radio and television
broadcasting, of course in keeping with the Islamic
criteria, explains that, “the appointment and dismissal of
the head of the Radio and Television of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran rests with the Leader.” Moreover, Article
175 states that a council consisting of two representa-
tives each of the President, the head of the judiciary
branch, and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the
Iranian Parliament shall supervise the functioning of
IRIB [11]. The first article of the statute of IRIB [12] em-
phasizes the state regime’s ownership and administration
and determines that radio and television broadcasting
(IRIB) is administered based on the said law, the law
stipulating the policies of the organization and this
article of association under the joint supervision of the
three branches of government.
According to the regulations related to the Internet
infrastructure, the access service provider (ASP) for
Internet connections is monopolized and owned by the
state regime. Every governmental department or public
sector which demands to provide its own ISP must re-
quest a legal license and official permission from the
Ministry of Communication [13]. Although the Internet
in Iran is under the strict control of the state regime and
the control is being reinforced through different surveil-
lance and filtering policies [14], there is a counterflow of
unofficial and alternative media platforms that many Iran-
ian users have access to with the help of VPNs and
anti-filters. For instance, there are many different blogs
and web pages that are filtered by the force of govern-
ment, but they are still producing different kinds of digital
contents for their target audiences (e.g., private and per-
sonal blogs, podcasts, pages and groups on social media).
According to Iran’s press law, the publication of pri-
vate and commercial press is allowed for any actual or
legal person with specific criteria, like having Iranian
citizenship, having the financial resources, and proving
particular literacy qualifications [15]. In this sense, press
media platforms are relatively colorful in Iran, and many
different private presses are being published in different
fields. However, there are several print and online press
media that are owned and administered by the state re-
gime. These presses are considered public media in
some official documents and regulations, but they meet
the characteristics of state media in several significant
ways. They have an annual share of the annual govern-
ment budget, they use state-secured funds, and they are
under the control of the state regime financially and
editorially. These press media are usually considered as
the mainstream print media in Iran since they have
bigger circulations and they do not encounter any finan-
cial problems due to their stable share of governmental
budgets.
Djankov and his colleagues [16] argue that state-owned
media distort and manipulate information to entrench the
incumbent politicians, preclude voters and consumers
from making informed decisions, and ultimately under-
mine both democracy and the markets. In contrast, pri-
vate and independent media supply alternative views to
the public and enable individuals to choose among
political candidates, goods, and securities—with less
fear of abuse by unscrupulous politicians, producers,
and promoters. Moreover, the notion of competition
among private and commercial media ensures that
voters, consumers, and investors obtain, on average,
unbiased and accurate information.
Media control is the second element of the relation-
ship between media and politics in Iran. Whether in the
Islamic Republic of Iran state regime or in the previous
imperial government in Pahlavi era, all different regimes
and governments have always aimed to control and sup-
press the media sphere in Iran by any means. The gen-
eral methods Iran’s state regime employs to control and
dominate the entire media sphere are the following: de-
termining broadcasting media policies in a governmental
supervision council, press media license detention, vis-
ible and invisible ways of censorship, and filtering digital
media contents on the Internet.
As Mohsenian Rad [1] notes, in the first years of private
radio broadcasting in Iran, the imperial government was
exerting many different approaches of censorship to pre-
vent any kind of voice diversity in the radio programs,
particularly in news and political contents. After the
monopolization of media broadcasting in the Pahlavi era
and the continuous state ownership of broadcasting
systems after the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, the
whole process of policy making came under the control of
the new regime. Article 16 of the Islamic radio and televi-
sion broadcasting statute [12] determines the duties and
authorities of the supervisory board. According to this art-
icle, the supervisory board is authorized to determine, pre-
pare, and modify the general broadcasting policies and
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propose the policy documents to be approved by Iran’s
Parliament (note 1). In addition, this board has the power
to supervise the broadcasting activities to ensure they are
in accordance with general policies, and to control the
frames of radio and television productions and programs
to be consistent with the state’s political policies (note 2,
note 3). The broadcasting supervision council is even au-
thorized to intervene in minor management issues, such
as appointment and dismissal of senior and mid-level
managers of the broadcasting system in offices both
domestic and abroad (note 15). This can illustrate the
dominance and authority of the state regime and its
branches on the radio and television broadcasting system.
According to Iran’s press law [15], any publication,
whether in print or in online news media, by actual and
legal persons with Iranian capital, requires obtaining a
license from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guid-
ance. Therefore, every commercial and private press is, in
a way, under the control of the state regime. A press
supervisory board is established to issue press licenses and
investigate the required qualifications of the actual or legal
person who seeks the license (article 11). The press super-
visory board consists of seven members from different
state sectors, taken from the following: the Ministry of
Justice, the Parliament, the Supreme Council of Cultural
Revolution, Hoze-Elmie-Ghom (the main Shia religious
school in Iran), press director (chosen from within), and
universities’ professors (chosen by the minister of Science,
Research, and Technology); the final member is the
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Obviously, all
the decisions of the supervisory board are under the con-
trol and dominance of the state regime, since it has six
members out of seven on the board. In other words, the
state regime is entitled to decide who is eligible to have a
publication license and who is not.
In addition, the press supervisory board is responsible
for investigating and probing the violation of law by any
publication and for reporting to the Ministry of Justice.
The press court, which is a part of the Ministry of Just-
ice, is authorized to punish any violator by temporary
suspension or permanent license detention. Iran’s press
law [15] determines what kinds of contents and acts are
considered violation of law; accordingly, the state regime
is actually controlling the process and quality of content
production in all private and commercial press and news
media as well.
However, it must be mention that there is a counter-
flow of press and online media in Iran which allows the
audiences to use alternative media contents by bypassing
the state regime’s control. For example, a small number
of the underground press are being published in Iran
without having any official license or being supervised
by the press supervisory board [17]. The satellite televi-
sion channels which are considered illegal and do not
have any broadcasting licenses in Iran are another ex-
ample of this alternative media flow. Similarly, many
Internet users in Iran use VPNs and anti-filters to get ac-
cess to online websites and digital media platforms that
are filtered by Iran’s state regime. In this sense, Iranian
users are using a considerable number of social network-
ing platforms (i.e., Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and
Telegram) and online news media (i.e., BBC and VOA)
though many of these digital media have been banned
and filtered by the state regime or operated within the
multiple legal limitations.
The influence of the state regime on media content pro-
duction is the third element of the relationship between
media and politics in Iran. Generally, the fundamental
goal and mission of the state-owned media platforms in
Iran is to recreate and propagate the political and cultural
discourses, which are desirable and advantageous for the
state regime, particularly Islamic-based ones. Hence, it
can be claimed that the state regime in Iran aims to use
its own media and enforce private independent media
platforms to promote and propagate the Islamic, trad-
itional, and ideological values and discourses.
According to Article 9 of the radio and television
broadcasting statute [12], the main goal of radio and
television broadcasting is to promote the Islamic culture.
The other indicated aims of the IRIB are the following:
preparing the social environment for public education
and refinement, increasing people’s moral virtues, and
accelerating the evolutionary path of Islamic Revolution
worldwide. The Article 11 of the mentioned statute em-
phasizes the international function of broadcasting and
explains that radio and television broadcasting have to
develop international relations and communications in
the light of Islam and Islamic standards. Similarly, the
third article of the law for general policies and principles
of the Islamic radio and television broadcasting [12] ob-
ligates all the media broadcasting programs to consider
the supreme leader’s demands and discernments as the
core priority in all aspects of content production. More-
over, several articles of the mentioned law emphasize the
responsibility of radio and television broadcasting for
preventing the promotion of Western culture and critics
of an Islamic Revolution.
In Article 2 of Iran’s press law [15], it has been stated
that all press media have an essential duty to preserve
and consolidate the Iranian state regime’s anti-Western
cultural policies. All press media are responsible for pro-
moting Islamic cultural values and norms, and they must
combat the manifestations of Western and colonialist
culture. According to this article, press media must be in
line with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policies and
paths. In a newer revision, which has been included in
Iran’s press law [15], all these responsibilities have been
applied to all online and digital news media, digital
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versions of press and publications, and online news
agencies and websites. In this sense, all different kinds of
news media platforms including traditional press and
Internet-based online news media are restricted by the
state regime to produce media content inside the dom-
inant Islamic discourse. The violation of these rules and
norms is considered to be a violation of the law, and the
violator media platform will be subject to a vast
spectrum of punishments and penalties.
As mentioned before, there has always been a media
counterflow that attempts to appear as an alternative
platform and bypass the state regime’s restrictions. Ac-
cordingly, alternative media platforms in Iran, meaning
those independent media that can bypass the control
and censorship, usually aim to produce some alternative
media contents. These alternative media try to provide
their audiences with different modernist media content
including secular, feminist, environmental, liberal, leftist,
and ethnic-based ideas. They empower the audiences to
choose their desired content among a colorful spectrum
of contents. However, it can be said that these media
platforms are generally concentrated on pro-Western
and somewhat anti-traditionalist values and cultural
characteristics.
Systematic causes: semi-totalitarian regime and
its dissidents
The level of the social cause in CLA is the systematic
level in which the social causation in terms of the links
between the individuals and society are analyzed. Ac-
cording to Inayatullah [18], the role of the state and
other actors and interests is often explored at this level.
As he explains, the two key questions asked at this level
are, “who is responsible for this?” and “what policies and
structures gave rise to this?”. Accordingly, we aim to
analyze different key actors involved in shaping the rela-
tionship between media and politics in Iran. We explain
the role of each actor, the historical period in which each
actor and its role have been crucial and influential, and
the main reasons and causes that made every actor to
play a role and act in a certain trajectory.
The state regime has always been the key actor that
determined the relationship between media and politics
in Iran (Table 2). After the Iranian Revolution and from
the first days of the establishment of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, the state regime attempted to control and
dominate the media sphere locally and nationally. State
ownership of the only broadcasting system in Iran; the
publication of several state-owned newspapers, press,
and online news media; and the use of different tools of
suppression like censorship, filtering, and license deten-
tion are the manifestations of the state regime’s attempt
to dominate all kinds of media platforms in Iran. The
state regime’s dominance over the media sphere is also
extended to the telecommunication technologies and in-
frastructures. For example, almost all the key telecommu-
nication infrastructures for the Internet connections in
Iran are state-owned and cross over a state firm, known as
the “Telecommunications Infrastructure Company (TIC)”
[19]. According to different laws [12, 20], private individ-
uals and organizations are not allowed to import or pos-
sess any kind of broadcasting technological infrastructure
in Iran. Moreover, the activity of any private and/or for-
eign radio and television channel accessible by the satellite
receivers are forbidden and considered illegal.
As a semi-totalitarian regime, Iran’s state regime has
always aimed to dominate the media sphere to use it as
a propaganda machine that works in favor of its own
ideological discourses and against its dissidents. Promot-
ing Islamic and revolutionary values is one of the most
crucial objectives of the state regime, and it can be ac-
complished by dominating and using the media sphere.
As mentioned before, promoting and propagating Is-
lamic values has been repeatedly mentioned in different
laws, legislation and instructional recommendations as
the main ultimate purpose of media in Iran. In addition,
Iran’s state regime influences the media sphere in de-
manding propagation of enmity toward Western coun-
tries and preventing the extension of Western cultural
values. As the idea of Western enmity becomes the focal
node after its establishment, state-owned media broad-
casting and press have also historically tried to
emphasize the Islamic revolutionary discourses [21, 22].
For example, the state-owned broadcasting system in
Iran extensively covers the annual demonstrations on
the anniversary of the 1978 Revolution, in which the
ideological slogans against the United States of America
Table 2 The key actor in the relationship between media and
politics
Actor - The state regime (key actor)
Influential period - 1978-present
Reason - Promoting socialist economic values
(and some liberal values and concepts
like entrepreneurship) in recent years
(particularly in the mid-1990s)
- Promoting Islamic and revolutionary
values
- Propagating the idea of enmity between
Iran and Western countries, specifically
the USA
- Mobilizing public masses against
pro-Western elites
Influence on media politics - Dominating media ownership
- Dominating media content production
- Controlling media by censorship/filtering
and other suppression means
- Handling key media infrastructures like
ASPs or broadcasting
- Banning alternative infrastructures like
satellite TV or private ASPs
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are repeated every year. In this sense, the state regime
has always utilized the dominated media platforms to
not only promote the enmity with Western countries
but also to implicitly mobilize the public mass against
pro-Western social communities and elites.
However, the state regime is not the only actor in the re-
lationship between media and politics in Iran. In the
current historical period, other actors have become influ-
ential and effective in determining this relationship by
their roles and their original aims [23]. About 10 years
after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when the governmen-
tal economy and pro-socialist economic policies started to
fail in realizing their promises and privatization of econ-
omy started to rise, the market became a crucial actor in
the media sphere in Iran. Commercial and private news-
papers and publications started to emerge, and they were
supposed to convey a counterflow of content production
in the media sphere.
In 1997, when the reformist political parties succeeded
to win the presidential election, a powerful public
demand emerged for a colorful media sphere. As many
claim [24–26], the reformist government aimed to
relatively decrease the control and pressure on the civil
society to allow the private press and media to be more
independent and to allow more the freedom of speech.
In this era, the civil society in Iran became an important
actor in the relationship between media and politics.
The civil society was empowered to facilitate the publi-
cation of small and medium size newspapers and differ-
ent kinds of publications. At the same time, the
reduction of state control over the media sphere caused
the emergence of more independent media platforms
striving to convey a voice for the voiceless. Although
many relatively independent newspapers emerged in this
era, trying to stand in a critical position in contrast with
state-owned media, many of these publications encoun-
tered license detention and became suspended by the
state regime’s judiciary which was generally in line with
the supreme leader and the previous president of Iran
who generally had enough legal capability to dictate
macro-policies of regime.
Technology has been another key actor in the relation-
ship between media and politics. From 2005 till the
present, the growth of telecommunication technologies,
the rise of the Internet and satellite television channels,
and the emergence of social media platforms have chan-
ged the relationship between media and politics and af-
fected the crucial role of the state regime in determining
the rules and regulations of the media sphere. The wide
access to, and the huge range of, opposing media con-
tent, and comprehensive information on the Internet
made the digital and online media relatively uncontrol-
lable by the state regime. Although the state regime
strongly attempts to control the digital media by
different means of filtering, the emergence of VPNs and
other proxies have empowered the Iranian people to use
the digital media in the way they want and access almost
anything they want on the Internet. Similarly, when the
television and radio satellite receivers became access-
ible and popular in Iran, many media users started to
consume these media platforms’ production instead of
the state-owned broadcasting programs transmitted by
IRIB or conventional state-owned press media. Despite
the official legislation which bans the consumption of
satellite channels in Iran, millions of Iranians watch
foreign-based channels via illegal satellite dishes and
receivers at their homes and regularly use these satellite
television channels [27].
It can be claimed that although the market, civil soci-
ety, and technology have played crucial roles in deter-
mining the relationship between media and politics in
Iran, the state regime has been and still is the most
important key actor. The only legal broadcasting system
in Iran with more than 95% of Iranian population as its
audiences is still owned by the state regime and adminis-
tered by the state regime. The number of state-owned
print and online news media is far larger than the
private and relatively independent media, and they are
financially secured by the state secure budgets and fi-
nancial aids. Hence, they are far more influential in the
media sphere by having higher circulations. Moreover,
the state ownership of the Internet infrastructures in
Iran makes the state regime capable of controlling the
speed and traffic of the Internet broadband. In this
sense, when the state regime has complete control over
the ASP and is also capable of tracking digital transac-
tions and controlling the speed and traffic of the Inter-
net, one could conclude that it is extremely difficult for
the Internet users to use VPNs and proxies, specifically
in crucial situations. For example, in 2009 post-election
protests in Iran, the state regime almost shut down the
Internet. The speed and traffic of data transformation
were extremely low; thus, nobody could even use the
regular non-filtered web pages.
The worldview: controversy between
traditionalism and modernism
To grasp the deeper layer of causes, we must investigate
what latent worldviews provide the sociocultural constructs
behind the litany layer. The language and conception play
crucial roles in this stage because they do not simply reflect
the world, but they constitute it, according to the
post-structuralist premises of CLA. Although CLA is pri-
marily a post-structuralist approach, in this layer of analysis,
it utilizes discourse analysis as a theoretical framework as
well as a methodology for social sciences and related stud-
ies in a broad sense. While different versions of discourse
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analysis (DA) meet various questions [28, 29], CLA mainly
relies on critical discourse analysis (CDA), particularly the
Foucauldian approach to CDA [10, 18].
“Struggle over meaning” is a crucial concept in this
layer. Discourses as meaning orders articulate them-
selves around a focal node, which organizes some other
nodes in turn to construct a cohesive and prevalent body
of knowledge. However, there is no society in which just
a single discourse can be identified practically. Although
struggle over meaning is the dominant one, others quar-
rel to find more hegemonic positions. In addition, we
should consider the fact that original discourses are usu-
ally limited and durable. As Foucault [30] indicates,
mega-discourses are just two or three during a long
period of time. Although there is a limited specific litera-
ture about the relationship between media and politics
in early periods in which press media arrived in Iran as a
new literary genre, and modernity converted into a
political objective as a new body of knowledge, we
can interpret some of the valuable inquiries [31, 32]
demonstrating how the struggle for modernism crys-
tallized the vital social and political transformations.
As a result, we can track back to find a blueprint in
which one of the most original discursive struggles
has been triggered and continued for almost two cen-
turies in the modern history of Iran.2
According to Sharifi [31], for instance, there are two
basic pre-modern signifiers that constitute the official
state discourse from the Shah Abbas Safavi era (1587–
1629) until the 1906 Constitutional Revolution: Islam
and security. Encountering Western modernity after
1870, new thoughts and opinions suggested some alter-
native signifiers in order to create several new imagined
political discourses: law, development, people/democ-
racy, and class/equality. After the mid-1850s, those who
believed in Islamic politics were divaricated into two
different groups: those traditionalists who rejected the
West, due to its corruptive effects on Islam, and those
modernists who advocated adopting the new Western
values and concepts like constitution, citizenship, and
civil law. Sharifi [31] concludes that we can trace all
these contending signifiers in political texts after the
1900s, albeit with different sets of meaning.
Various genealogies of discourses, emerged from the
early modern history of Iran in the nineteenth century
until the present, have a common criterion for
categorization: how to provoke a response to the west
[32–34]. For instance, Hajarian [35] distinguishes three
discourses based on which the relationship between
“self” and “other” could be made: (1) “the deconstruction
of tradition,” in which tradition and its manifestations
like Islam are considered to be the only factor that has
caused Iranians to lag behind the civilization; therefore,
they have to be abolished; (2) “the resurgence of
tradition” in which the marginal elites, particularly left-
ists, strive to restore tradition to its focal position in so-
cial and political transformations; (3) “the reconstruction
of tradition” in which several intellectuals in diverse
camps make a widely decentralized effort to integrate
the dynamic elements of tradition into modernism.
Hajarian believes that the renewal begins after the Is-
lamic Revolution of Iran in 1978–1979. However, the en-
deavor to reconciliation between tradition and
modernity indicates implicitly that we should detect
some types of struggle at first.
The struggle between tradition and modernity reached
its culmination when the Iranian Revolution achieved
final victory in 1978–1979. Under the umbrella of a cha-
rismatic cleric, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, the new
political regime was established: the Islamic Republic of
Iran. As this new title vividly indicates, the challenges
between modernist and traditionalist discourses entered
a new phase in which both discourses had some sort of
political power in various governing bodies. It resulted
in an ongoing gap between different administrative
structures as well as political recruitments in recent
years [36]. Those who were traditionalists before became
radical modernists after. The essential gap historically
occurred at the beginning of the new regime when
Mehdi Bazargan, one of the most prominent modernist
figures, was forced to resign from the head of Iran’s
interim government as the result of burdensome pres-
sure from traditionalists who played a significant role in
political decision-making, particularly after Khomeini
supported the US Embassy takeover by one of the most
radical Islamist groups, the Muslim Student Followers of
the Imam’s Line.
According to Soltani [32], modernists and traditional-
ists who were two wings of the revolution’s victory and
the supporters of Khomeini’s leadership before the
revolution split into two different camps advocating
different focal nodes: Islamic versus Republican. Islam-
ists who constitute the Islamic Republican Party (IRP)
in early years utilized some discursive armaments such
as “clergy,” “supreme leadership,” and “religious juris-
prudence” in their controversies against modernists
who tended to institutionalize some modern concepts
such as “citizenry,” “legislation,” and “freedom”. This
discursive duality has lasted throughout the whole his-
tory of Iran’s post-revolution era and crystallized there-
after in political controversies, particularly regarding
presidential elections in which a pro-modernist candi-
date campaigned against a pro-traditionalist group of
candidates [37–40].
The traditionalist discourse is being hyped by the
mainstream media, as traditionalists have gained the
upper hand in political power. They legally control not
only the monopolized radio and television broadcasting
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system but also the necessary financial and legislative
apparatus to propagate the traditional values in the pub-
lic sphere. Dominated by pro-traditionalists, some
executive organizations, which are not supposed to own
a media platform, allocate a huge amount of resources
to media practices. To understand how the traditionalist
worldview is embedded in the mainstream media, it is
enough to say, for instance, that according to the Deputy
of Press and Information Affairs, affiliated to the Minis-
try of Culture and Islamic Guidance,3 there are 28
licensed legal Persian news agencies, of which at least 15
directly or indirectly belong to clerics and military orga-
nizations promoting traditionalism even through sport
news services (like supporting the “hijab” worn by fe-
male athletes), in addition to the IRIB news department,
which is the most powerful news agency due to the fact
that it legally monopolizes the right of TV and radio broad-
casting. Supported by different theocratic institutions, most
of these organizations have their own platforms like news-
papers, magazines, and periodicals. Despite the discursive
diversity among different clerical or militant organizations,
what they prescribe for the vast range of socio-cultural
and political issues is always extracted from different
versions of traditionalist discourse, whether the su-
preme leadership of a cleric plays a central role in a
particular articulation or not.
Declining the dominant traditionalist discourse, the
alternative media have always strived to promote mod-
ernist discourse. The alternative press media have con-
ventionally played a vital role in the contemporary
history of Iran; their highest peak coincides with the
evolutionary periods that the rise against traditionalism
becomes one of the essential axioms of social struggles
to establish a more democratic political system. Dis-
senting journalists were always the leading figures of
the constitutional movement from 1905 to 1911,
nationalization of Iran’s oil industry movement in 1951,
and Iran’s Revolution of 1979–1980. Regardless of
some various aspects and objectives, they share a firm
belief in the demolishment of the despotism as the
main symbol of traditionalism. This notion is
crystallized by the concept of “rule of law” during the
constitutional age; “nationalization” by Mohammad
Mossadegh, as an opposing prime minister who fought
against the monarchy power; and “Republicanism” by
national-religious factions supporting the Ayatollah
Khomeini at the advent of the revolution. Iranian re-
formists then employed the power of alternative news-
papers to rapidly expand a new version of modernist
discourse, relied on the notation of citizenry as the
focal node, articulating other signs like legislation, pol-
itical development, civil society, freedom, and reforms.
Although it was the dominant party from 1997 to 2005,
the widespread closure of alternative newspapers in
2000 [40] was just a link of the long chain of events, in-
dicating that Iran has a long run to be released from
traditionalism.
Given that the Internet has been developing enor-
mously all around the world, publishing becomes easier,
and broadcasting emerges from the state’s monopoly.
The alternative media also has been growing in recent
years. However, the pressure and constraint with which
they are faced remain persistently as the discursive
struggle which does not direct to a point of compromise
or ultimate dominance. The rapid expansion of new ICT
technologies provides a great opportunity to propagate
the various modernist discourses by alternative media,
including feminist approaches, liberal politics, environ-
ment advocacy perspectives, and leftist criticism. Con-
sidering the substantial modality of alternative media,
including digitality, virtuality, interactivity, hypertextual-
ity, networking, and simulating [41], the expansion of
new ICT technologies facilitate alternative media prac-
tices, as different practitioners from different social
strata could actively participate in the flow of communi-
cation and generate alternative contents through alterna-
tive channels like citizen journalism, telegram channels,
advocacy group websites, and activist hidden forums. On
the other hand, surveillance technologies are developed
simultaneously by the state regime; hence, the traditional
powerful institutions possess the more effective equip-
ment to ban, block, filter, or slow down different parts of
the Internet. It also enhances the ability of security orga-
nizations dominated by traditionalists to track dissident
activities, keep records of their deficiency, and accuse
them of dissident views and activities in their ordinary
life. Consequently, not only the new ICT technologies
create a new open virtual space to listen to more varying
modernist voices through the alternative media but also
they make it possible to suppress these voices by threat-
ening modern individuals to disclose their personal in-
formation or prosecution of modernist advocacy groups
based on media evidence.
The metaphor: “A wise king educating an
unworthy populace”
To unfold the deepest layer of causes, we must go
beyond the contemporary history of Iran’s modernity to
find an ultimate metaphor or myth behind the present
situation and its social and cultural causes. As the his-
tory of media in the conventional sense goes back to the
nineteenth century when the first periodicals aspiring to
imitate Western newspapers were published [42], we
should investigate another prevailing literary genre to
identify the metaphor. In pre-modern Persian literature,
a couple of prominent travelogues have been written for
the illiterate populace to be trained, amused, and edu-
cated. In other words, these travelogues are some kinds
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of educational written forms with which the composer
attempts to familiarize the readers with social and moral
thoughts by the application of travel anecdotes, though
they are considered to be some pieces of prose literature
nowadays. The travelogues consist of the education of
morality, social norms, wisdom, etc. with lots of infor-
mation derived from travel anecdotes that the com-
posers observed or heard from somebody else.
The notion of totalitarianism is also embedded broadly
in the Iranians’ ancient literature, as we can identify it in
written pieces of Saadi of Shiraz, one of the most promin-
ent composers of Iran in the medieval age. For instance,
he tells many of his travel anecdotes in “Gulistan,” chapter
7, concerning the effects of education. However, he con-
stantly emphasizes on the inability of ordinary people to
become informed and knowledgeable. He quotes from a
king that “he whose foundation is bad will not take in-
struction from the good; to educate unworthy persons is
like throwing nuts on a cupola” [43]. The king actu-
ally rejects the possibility of pedagogy concurrent
with the medieval notation of education, as his pref-
erence is “to extirpate the race and offspring of these
people and to dig up their roots and foundations”.
Consequently, the good (Saadi himself, or generally
“Darvishes”) has to centralize his endeavor to educate
the king by aphorism, as he names the first chapter
of his book as “the manner of king”.
The combined thematic content of travelogues pro-
vides a foundational metaphor for the relationship
between media and politics, contrary to the hypothetic-
ally so-called concept of “the 4th pillar of democracy” in
the Western history of media in the nineteenth century.
At the advent of the modern era, Iranian intellectuals
subsumed the notion of education into pedagogy in
order to engender a new modern manner in the popu-
lace. Here, the role of a wise king is replaced with a
couple of diverse modernist groups who avow their
commitments, whether to educate all folks or to instruct
the king on how to establish a more modern society in
the early modern era, during the governance of Qajar
Dynasty (1789–1925). The first Iranian periodicals were
published during this period of time when the most prom-
inent chancellor of Iran, Mirza-Taghi-Khan Farahani,
known as Amir Kabir, founded an official newspaper in
Iran, “Vaghaye Etefaghie,” translated to “events,” with a
key slogan: “the kingly scramble of the majesty was busied
with the education of peasants, merchants, tradespeople…
as though he ordered the kingdom to publish this gaz-
ette...” [44]. Simultaneously, he established the first Iranian
modern school, called “Dar al-Fanun,” translated to
“graduate school,” to educate the students with new sci-
ences including physics and mathematics. At the same
time, the traditional schools (“Maktabkhaneh” translated
to “school”) were just teaching the conventional religious
expertise and knowledge to train clerics. The basic estab-
lishment of “Dar al-Fanun,” then, transformed into the
first university of Iran, the “University of Tehran,” by the
founder of Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–1979). In the late nine-
teenth century, Iranian intellectuals had romantically pur-
sued the project of raw modernization by pedagogy. They
were operating in the aftermath of the Constitutional
Revolution, including the failure of economic develop-
ments, as well as the solidification of order and security,
and political conflicts caused by the decentralization of
power.
This era is likely to be acknowledged as the era of “ro-
manticizing education,” given the fact that Iranian intel-
lectuals not only advocated for a kind of sentimental
individualism but also glorified the past splendidly.
Firstly, the individualism (at least in the ontological
level) was a prerequisite for any modern reformist who
attempted to make more effective political and social
constructions. These reformers sentimentally supposed
that everybody naturally demands to be free as ever as
the social structures allow them to remember the natural
state of freedom. They believed the new media and mod-
ern schools must fulfill this prophecy by advocating the
new social structures and opposing the obsolete orders.
Secondly, supported by various adaptive perspectives,
they attempted to provide a trialogue between Islam,
pre-Islamic history, and modernity, while the outcome
was usually apparent: modernity is an intrinsic quality
that should see a revival in the ordinary people, brought
about by pedagogy. Furthermore, the illiterate populace
would absolutely embrace this reform, as they vividly
perceived that any further delay could result in less pro-
gress and more despotism. Thus, they were unable to
foresee how the new dictatorship of Pahlavi could simply
emerge by the coup of 1921.
In 1925, “Reza Khan,” the first Pahlavi Shah of Iran,
started enforcing a series of regulations, legislation, and co-
ercive rules to modernize Iran’s society. The coercive
modernization, also called the authoritarian modernization
[45], changed the previous anti-intellectual ideas about
modernization and reform and transformed the process of
bottom-up modernization by educating the ordinary
people into a state-conducted project to coercively inject
modernization and modern values into all social strata.
During the whole Pahlavi era, Iran’s state regime consid-
ered media platforms as the powerful instruments with
which people can be educated with modern values and
brought to adopt modern norms in their personal lives. At
the same time, the government created a strict system for
controlling media with licensing and censorship, to prevent
critical and opposite media platforms from conducting
realistic discussions about the authoritarian progress
of modernization. When “Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,”
the second Pahlavi Shah of Iran, was appointed, the
Talebian and Talebian European Journal of Futures Research  (2018) 6:8 Page 11 of 15
new government was again highly concentrated on
the process of coercive modernization and did not
tolerate any opposition against its politics regarding
the enforcement of modern norms.
After the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution, when a short
period of media freedom provided with the new revolu-
tionary atmosphere passed, the focal metaphor around
the essential function of media as educational apparatus
remained unchanged and the new regime just changed
some marginal components of this fundamental meta-
phor. In his first public speech in Iran after 14 years liv-
ing in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini stated that “Cinema is
one of the civilization manifestation which has to serve
to educate people”. Along with the domination of Islamist
discourses, the state regime legitimated the basic role of
clerics or representatives to be in charge of educating
people in all different aspects of social life, including the
media practice, the pedagogical efforts in primary kinder-
gartens, schools, universities, or other forms of unofficial
education, like artistic activities and religious ceremonies.
Furthermore, the state regime determined that the Islamic
values and approaches must be the main core of any kind
of education, conveyed by media contents generated by
different governmental and ideological organizations.
From the first months after the Islamic Revolution until
now, the most crucial priority of the state regime concern-
ing media has been focused on embedding Islamic values
in media content in order to educate people in a
top-down manner. Although the influence and reliability
of media platforms have been doubted in different points,
enormous budgets have been spent on different media
genre, like costly movies, to serve the main focal meta-
phor, which is still about educating people and has never
changed.
On the other hand, the alternative media in Iran is also
organized to play the same role in educating people but
with different content and approach. As the modernist
discourses became the subaltern opponent after the
Iranian Revolution, they attempted to use alternative
media to fill the socio-political vacancy caused by the ab-
sence of any modernist response to any dilemma. In other
words, the official state-owned and state-controlled media
have been unable to realize that a civil society moving for-
ward to the modern institutional orders cannot be easily
persuaded by media content derived from traditional solu-
tions. In this state of affairs, alternative media comply with
an immense responsibility to diffuse the modern view-
points in terms of what fallacies the public affirms as the
result of mainstream media practices. This task is intrin-
sically perceived as an educational performance, even
though it would be a concert, a foreign soap opera, a
social media channel about a woman’s right to refuse the
compulsory veil, the sensational journalism, a TV series
against the various minority stereotyping, or any other
media forms and contents not regularly admitted by the
governmental media, totalitarian legislation, and trad-
itional discourses. Thus, the contradictory dialectic be-
tween tradition and modernity, at least in the media
sphere, has been capable of maintaining for almost two
centuries, since they both confess to a common metaphor
to educate the public by media instead of pedagogy.
Conclusions
In this article, we attempt to investigate the multiple
layers of causes that constitute the current relationship
between media and politics in Iran. The interconnec-
tions of each layer have been established a long time ago
and have been maintained rigorously. These intercon-
nections are also beneficial in identifying which solutions
might be suggested by for the problems in each layer.
However, any given solution is not required to be simply
practical, since different layers of analysis from apparent
issues to the more deeply latent controversies or com-
promises take us into the more abstract notions that we
cannot translate into a specific policy or agenda. Even
though offering a solution is highly problematic, we
point out our rational resolutions in the following table
(Table 3), as it also summarizes our findings in each
layer of analysis.
Through the analysis of the relationship between
media and politics in Iran in four causal layers, we
construct three possible scenarios for the future of
media and politics in Iran. Inayatullah [3] argues that
the possible scenarios for the future of the issue
under the study can be constructed according to the
results of each analysis layer. Litany-type scenarios are
more instrumental, systematic-level scenarios are more
policy oriented, and discourse scenarios intend to capture
fundamental differences. Conversely, metaphor-type sce-
narios are equally discreet but articulate this differ-
ence through a poem, a story, an image, or some
other right-brain method.
We construct three possible scenarios for the future
relationship between media and politics in Iran
Table 3 Findings and solutions in each analysis layer
Layers Results and solutions
Litany Mainstream media vs. alternative media—solution
is in increasing “freedom of speech”
Systematic causes Semi-totalitarian regime vs. dissidents—solution is
that it has to be repulsed by the civil society,
completed by the market, and disarmed by ICT
technology advancement
Discourses/
worldview
Traditionalism vs. modernism—solution is in
the historical empowerment of modern
discourses to a compromise or supremacy
Myth/metaphor Top-down education myth—solution is that the
prophecy of education should be thwarted by a
modernist responsibility to education vis-a-vis
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according to the findings of the discourse/worldview
layer. Through the discourse scenarios, we are capable
of understanding the general and fundamental differ-
ences of various alternative scenarios in the long-term
future. Moreover, we believe that discourse-based sce-
narios are relatively general and macro-level scenarios
by which different audiences and interest groups can
grasp the future’s conditions of media and politics in
Iran and conduct their policy plans through this under-
standing. While litany scenarios are more useful for
managers and social cause scenarios are more beneficial
for policy makers, discourse scenarios are constructed in
a more academic manner and they are beneficial for
grasping the long-term futures’ alternatives.
Table 4 illustrates the nutshell of three possible scenar-
ios for the future of media and politics in Iran:
The first scenario, “media struggle,” is the scenario
which shows the continuous struggle between the trad-
itionalist discourse and the modernist discourse. In this
scenario, Iran’s state regime remains semi-totalitarian
and it continues to dominate, control, and suppress the
media sphere. While some private and commercial press
and media continue to work and publish in the media
struggle scenario, the state regime stays as the main
actor which regulates and control independent media
and supervises their content production to be in line
with the regime’s ideological and political purposes. The
role of civil society as an actor in the relationship be-
tween media and politics in Iran remains fragile and in-
significant, and it will not be able to make any
considerable change in the media sphere. This scenario
illustrates the limited and small changes and innovations
in the telecommunication technological aspects in Iran.
In other words, whether a revolutionary technological
breakthrough emerges or not, the state regime will not
allow new participatory media technologies to be
imported and used in Iran with the help of suppressive
policies and legislation.
The second scenario, “diverse media,” is the scenario
of modernist discourse predominance. It shows the
emergence of more democratic dimensions in Iran’s
state regime. In this scenario, Iran’s state regime starts
to evolve from a semi-totalitarian regime to a more
democratic political system in which freedom of speech
and the diverse media sphere are considered legitimate
and acceptable. Private and commercial media platform
can work in a competition-based media market, and the
state regime will play the role of facilitator and regulator
in practical aspects, instead of owning and monopolizing
media platforms. In this scenario, the new and trans-
formative communication technologies emerge and be-
come known and used among Iranian media consumers
as well. In this sense, the level of state regime’s control
and surveillance in media sphere significantly decreases.
The third scenario, “surveillance media,” is the sce-
nario of the supremacy of the traditionalist discourse. In
this alternative scenario, Iran’s state regime grows to a
more totalitarian system of government and increases its
control over all aspects of the media sphere in Iran. The
state-owned media become larger in number and more
powerful with the help of state secured budgets, and pri-
vate and independent media platform are not powerful
and competitive enough to stay alive, effective, and agile.
The civil society will be suppressed by the state regime
and become more fragile and ineffective in the media
sphere. The new technological breakthroughs will be
used as surveillance tools in the state regime’s hands to
increase its control and dominance over the media
sphere by using new ways of filtering and censorship.
There are several tiny and huge remarks supporting
each of these explanatory scenarios, though none of
them have any emancipatory notion to unfold a more
desirable road map toward the preferred role of media
in Iran’s contemporary society with its colorful political
communities. According to the agenda-setting theories
of media effects, the media functions are more reliant on
what to think of rather than what to act on. To think,
one needs to be informed, but the education myth ex-
pects its audiences to behave. Herein, we can observe
that the three scenarios described before are the alterna-
tive scenarios, but at the same time, they are homoge-
neous scenarios as well. They are alternatives, as they
variously explain the most crucial discursive debates that
shape the surface levels of the relationship between
Table 4 Possible scenarios for the future of media and politics in Iran
Scenario (I): media struggle Scenario (II): diverse media Scenario (III): surveillance media
Semi-totalitarian state remains More democratic state emerges State grows to more totalitarian regime
Oligopoly media market with state regulatory
dominance, controlling media content and
infrastructures
More competitive media market with multi
stakeholders especially on infrastructures,
regulatory state without ownership
Media market reduces to less state competitor from
different state sectors, no public or private sector
particularly in infrastructures
Fragile civil society More powerful civil society Less powerful civil society
No evolutionary transformation in
media technology
Some revolutionary transformation occurs, to
some extent free of state control or surveillance
Surveillance technologies serve state and private
sectors to block or filter alternative voices
Traditionalism vs. modernism Modernism discourse predominance Traditionalism discourse supremacy
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media and politics in Iran, like policy making, media
coverage characteristics, media ownership, political cen-
sorship, and official versus satellite TV channels’ compe-
tition. However, these scenarios are homogeneous in a
way, because none of these explained significant dispar-
ities between modernist and traditionalist agenda vio-
lates the pervasive reality that there is one single and
common myth behind both the competing discourses.
None of the traditionalism and modernism discourses
represents itself to be singled out for some unique supe-
riorities; nevertheless, they implicitly claim that people
should learn to adhere to their universal values due to
their usefulness, legitimacy, novelty, antiquity, etc.,
whether the instrumental device to accomplish this task
is pedagogy or media.
In the emancipatory and desirable scenario, we are
seeking a future in which the media play their role as
the 4th pillar of democracy, where they just serve to in-
form rather than to educate. In this alternative future,
the political interest groups and the market or the state
regime will be limited to echoing their voice throughout
the public through their labeled and known media cam-
paigns, while the independent and public media reflect
the voice of the voiceless and deliver the marginalized
groups’ demands to the powerful politicians and firms.
In other words, the futures scenarios that we previously
constructed based on the results of the discourse level
elucidate the explanatory alternative scenarios which
possess a greater possibility of becoming the reality.
However, there is no limitation for a critical approach to
consider a wider vision of the future in which the con-
troversy between traditionalism and modernism in Iran
ends, and instead, a balanced synthesis of tradition and
modernity provides the prospect of a new postmodern
relationship between media and politics in Iran. Des-
pite the possibility of such a future vision and aside
from the presence of signs and evidence for the end
of traditionalism-modernism conflict, a futures sce-
nario in which the relationship between media and
politics become redefined and reframed through a
new discourse and a new power balance is the most
desirable alternative for the future of media and polit-
ics in Iran.
We believe that shaping an alternative emancipatory
scenario for the future of media politics in Iran requires
going beyond the boundaries of the modernist and trad-
itionalist forces which define the crucial social contra-
dictories in the systemic level and crystalize media
hostilities in the litany level. In other words, we believe
that uncovering the effects and influences of these dis-
courses on the relationship between media and politics
and discussing the alternatives are the essential responsi-
bility of any critical study as our own normative stand.
What we have done in this paper is to highlight how both
the modernist and traditionalist discourses competing
throughout the contemporary Iranian’s history articulate a
very peculiar relationship between media and education.
Having a critical approach, we aimed to deconstruct the
myth of education behind the relationship between media
and politics, in hope of constructing alternative desirable
futures in which media play their actual role as the fourth
pillar of democracy.
Endnotes
1In addition to executive branches, legislative and
judiciary bodies have their own media. There are also
several media organizations like IRIB and Jam-e-Jam
newspaper that are directly controlled by the supreme
leader, while other institutions, legally under the
supervision of the supreme leader, like military forces
and economic foundations, play a significant role in
administering some media platforms financially or
even editorially.
2In this section, we mainly rely on several scientific
sources that track back Iran’s historical transformation
after the nineteenth century with the concrete fact of
Western modernity’s entrance into undeveloped trad-
itional parts of the world like the Middle East, Latin
America, or China. As there is a rich literature about
this issue with various scopes and focuses about Iran,
quite a few inquiries directly employ DA and almost no
record can be found similar to our purpose. Conse-
quently, we decide to reread and process again the
pieces mentioned about the relationship between media
and politics in a specific historical period and broadly
classified political discourses in a wide period of time on
one hand and extract a coherent and continuous narra-
tive about the historical transformation of the tradition-
alist struggle against modernity on the other hand.
Although this kind of meta-analysis of secondary sources
has its own flaw, it is the only practical and reliable way
to verify our arguments in this paper, as our ambitious
gigantic research project to DA of the media documents
like the newspaper’s editorial columns after 1857 is being
conducted to understand which micro discourses could
be identified under the larger ones.
3The information here is extracted by authors ac-
cording to raw data released by the deputy of press
and information affairs on November 25, 2017. Follow
this link to access the Excel raw data file: https://
press.farhang.gov.ir/fa/kb/96
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